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COMPUTERS, COPYRIGHT & TYING
AGREEMENTS: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
ABANDONMENT OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
MARKET POWERt
GLEN P. BELVIS *
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property, by its very nature, is an area of law in which new factual and
legal issues will always be present.' The development of the computer is one example
of a new technology creating new legal questions in the law of intellectual property.
tCopyright 0 1987 Boston College Law School.
*Practicing attorney at Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson & Lione Ltd., Chicago, Illinois; B.S.
University of Notre Dame; J.D. University of DePaul Law School, 1985.
The term intellectual property describes patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets.
For an individual's work to be eligible for patent or copyright protection the work must have a
certain degree of newness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1982) (the subject matter of a patent must be
novel and non-obvious); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (the subject matter of a copyright must be
original). The federal - statute concerning patehts describes the availability of patents:. "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful procesS, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this tide." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The statute further provides that patents
are not available for an invention that is obvious:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not,
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
Id. 103. With respect to copyrights, the statute clearly requires originality: "Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed,. from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Additionally, unlike real property, patents and copyrights have limited durations. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154 (1982) (seventeen years for a patent); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982) (the life of the author plus
fifty years for a copyright), On the other hand, trademarks and trade secrets can theoretically exist
forever. 3 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS A1-33, A1-36 app. (1984). Thus, trademarks
and trade secrets can protect old works, for example Coca-Cola's trademark and formula, Never-
theless, when the work is first created a certain amount of newness is required to entitle it to either
trademark or trade secret protection. Id. at A1-23. For a trademark to be protected it does not
have to be novel or non-obvious, as a copyright or patent would require, but it must be distinct
enough from other marks in the area to avoid a likelihood of consumer confusion. Id. A trade
secret must be sufficiently new so that it can be distinguished from everyday knowledge. Id, Because
of this general requirement that intellectual property have some degree of newness to acquire
protection, this area of law will always be presented with unique and different subject matter.
Moreover, as new works are created the law must adapt to deal with such works. See, e.g., Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (extending patent protection to a living human-made micro-
organism); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 3 (1978) (discussing the inability of the pre-1976 copyright laws to cope with changing
technology) [hereinafter CONTU].
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Although certain issues regarding the scope of legal protection afforded to intellectual
property rights in computer programs remain unresolved, 2
 the general means of pro-
tection available to computer programs are well defined. Copyrights trade secret,' and
to a limited extent, patent , protections are all' available for computer programs. Yet,
affording protection to computer programs is only the first phase in the development
2
 For example, it is unclear how the fair use exception, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), will apply to
copyrighted computer programs.. See Grogan, Williams & Johnston, Implications of the Betamax
Decision in the Computer Software-Industry, COMPUTER LAw•, March, 1984, at 9. Under the fair use
provision, use of a copyrighted material - that is deemed "fair use" is not an infringement of a
copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
'.See Apple Computer, I,nc. v. Formula Intl- Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (extending
copyright protection to, computer operating systems program); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240i (3d Cir. 1983) (extending copyright protection to computer
operating systems programs), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Intl,
Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir, 1982). (enforcing copyright on application, program); see generally 1 D.
BENDER, COMPUTER LAW.§§, 4;01=4.04 (1986) (discussing statutory basis of copyright protection for
computer programs and recent cases dealing with copyright on computer programs); 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.94[C] (1986) (discussing copyright protection for computer data bases
and programs).
Technicon Medical.lnformation.Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging Inc., 687 F.2d 1032 (7th
Cir. 1982) (trade secret protection not preempted by 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1106. (1983); Warrington Assoc., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys. Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (trade secret protection not preempted by 1976 Copyright Act); CONTU supra note 1, at 18
("The availability of copyright for computer programs does not, of course, affect the availability of
trade secret protection."); see generally 1, D. BENDER, supra note 3, at § 4A.01 (discussing case law,
status, and practical considerations regarding trade secret protection of software); M. JAGER 1984
TRADE SECRETS LAW, HANDBOOK §§ 9.01-9.04 (discussing relevant case law that extended trade
secret protection to software), But see Laurie & Everett, Protection of Trade Secrets In Object Form
Software: The Case for. Reverse Engineering, Computer Law., July, 1984, at 1, 4 (asserting that trade
secret protection for software is preempted by copyright law). See infra note 189 for a discussion
of preemption analysis as it relates to copyright and trade secret law.
A computer program is considered a process , for the purpose of patent law. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 10I (1982). A "process is , a_ patentable invention provided it is new and useful. See supra note 1
for the text of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Process is defined in the statute as a "process, art or method, and
includes a,new .use of a known . process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
Id. § 100(b) (1982). There ; are four major Supreme. Court decisions which offer authority for
affording patent protection to computer programs but emphasize that the patentable program
must be new, .unobvious and more than simply a mathematical formula. Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175 (1981) (holding-that• a mathematical formula or a computer program is patentable if it is
claimed in connection with a physical process); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding a
particular computer program unpatentable because the only novel element of the program was the
mathematical algorithm used. and mathematical, formulas are not patentable); Dann v. Johnston,
425 U.S. 219 (1976) (holding computer program to be used in check processing by banks unpa-
tentable because obvious); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409,U.S. 63 (1972) (refusing a patent to a program
if the patent would:preempt a mathematical . algorithm, but stating that its decision does not preclude
patenti, for other computer programs).
Protection might also be obtained by patenting a programmed computer as a new machine.
See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). This alternative avoids the problems such as
associated , with patenting the program as a process. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that patenting
programmed computers would be an effective method of protecting computer programs because.
most programmed.computers would be obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) (one cannot obtain a patent
it the invention is obvious to a person, having ordinary skill in the art).
For a general discussion of the patentability of computer programs see 1 D. BENDER, supra note
3, at §§,3A.01-3A.07; J. Landis, Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting § 41 (2d ed. 1974)..
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of the law in response to this new technology. The second phase will be to determine
what effect these new rights, arising out of legal protection for computer programs,
have on other areas of the law. Any area of law that deals directly or indirectly with
property rights will be affected. For example, courts and legislatures will have to address
the effect that a property right in a computer program will have on criminal ,° commer-
cia1, 7 tax,8 and antitrust law.9
In antitrust law, the most significant issue raised by the recognition of a property
right in a computer program concerns the use of tying agreements. A tying agreement
exists whenever the seller conditions the purchase of one product (the tying product)
on the purchase of another product (the tied product). 1° Courts often have found that
tying agreements restrain competition and violate the antitrust laws." Under a three-
part test, a tying arrangement is per se illegal if the plaintiff proves that two separate
products are involved, the seller has sufficient market power in the tying product to
restrain competition in the tied product, and the arrangement affects substantial com-
merce in the tied market. 12
Computer programs have raised new issues in connection with tying agreements
which the courts have not yet resolved successfully. Many sellers of computer software
(computer programs) and hardware (the computers) sell their products in software/
hardware packages. In such arrangements, the software would be a tying product and
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, § 16-9(b)(2) (1986) (criminal penalties for wrongfully destroy.
ing or altering a computer program); ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 38, § 15-1 (1986) (includes computer
programs in definition of property for criminal provisions); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982) (federal
criminal trade secret statute); 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1982) (criminal liability for copyright infringement).
A computer program can serve as consideration for stock, The Model Business Corporation
Act states: "[t]he consideration for the issuance of shares may be paid, in whole or in part, in money,
in other property, tangible or intangible ...." Moon, BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 19 •1979). Watered
stock problems can arise when computer programs are used as consideration for stock. In a watered
stock situation the value of' the computer program exchanged for the stock is less than the stock's
stated consideration. The one who exchanged the computer program then could become personally
liable to the corporation's creditors for the difference between the computer program's value and
the stated consideration of the stock. Id. § 25; cf. Trotta v. Metalmold Corp., 139 Conn. 668, 96
A,2d 798, 97 U.S.P.Q. 239 (1953) (undervalued trade secret created a watered stock problem).
8 See generally TAxATioN COMMITTEE OF THE PATENT LAW AssocIA'rIoN OF CHICAGO, TAX GUIDE.
FOR PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS §1 1.01-4.03, 9.01-12.02 (1984) (general discussion of
the tax consequences of patent and copyright acquisition, ownership, and litigation); 1 R. MILGRIM,
Supra note 1, at § 6.04 (general discussion of taxability of trade secrets).
The primary impact in antitrust law of the recognition of a property right in a computer
program concerns the use of tying agreements under which the purchase of a computer program
or software is conditioned on the purchase of a computer or hardware. For a discussion of the
antitrust ramifications of copyright protection on a computer program, see infra notes 67-115 and
accompanying text. For a general discussion of the interaction of antitrust law and trade secret
protection, see W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §1 25.01-29.03 (1985).
For a discussion of the interaction between patent and antitrust law, see Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1815 (1984); see also W. HOLMES, supra at §§ 16.01-
24.05 (general discussion of patent-antitrust law).
' 8 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Bell v. Cherokee Aviation
Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1981); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
§ 150, at 431 (1977). A tying agreement also occurs when the buyer is forced to agree not to buy
the tied product from another supplier. Northern Pac., '356 U.S. at 5-6.
" See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
'2 See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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hardware would be a tied product. By selling these products as packages, however, many
companies are opening themselves up to claims that their package arrangements are per
se illegal.
In software/hardware packages, the first and third elements of the three-part test
for an illegal tying arrangement — separate products and a substantial effect on com-
merce — are almost always present. The second element — market power in the com-
puter program's market therefore is the central issue in most software/hardware tying
cases.
This article argues that to determine whether sufficient market power exists in the
program's market to restrain competition in hardware, courts should examine the pro-
gram's market to see if functional equivalents of the program exist or if the seller has a
monopoly on the product. Instead of making such an inquiry, however, courts have
borrowed inappropriately from patent law and copyright law pertaining to films to
presume the presence of market power in any case where the computer program in
question is copyrighted. Part I briefly outlines the three requirements to establish per se
illegality of a tying agreement: separate products, market power, and a substantial effect
on commerce. This part then reviews the second requirement, market power, in the
context of intellectual property law. From this general analysis, the article then analyzes
the rule that a copyright creates a presumption of market power. Specifically, Part I
evaluates the reasoning and rationale of the United States Supreme Court cases estab-
lishing that rule.
Part H of this article evaluates the application of the law prohibiting tying agree-
ments to computer hardware and software, concluding that in most situations involving
a seller of a package of hardware and software, the second requirement, market power,
will be the pivotal issue. Part II then considers the two cases that have thus far addressed
the issue of tying hardware to software; one holds that the presumption of market power
applies to a copyrighted computer program and the other holds that no such presump-
tion applies.
Part III of this article argues that a copyright on a computer program should not
create a presumption of market power for three reasons. First, in light of the differences
between the rights associated with patents and copyrights, the extension of the pre-
sumption of market power from patents to copyrights was incorrect. Specifically, the
rights associated with a patent create far greater market power than the rights associated
with a copyright.
Second, the presumption of market power for a copyright should not be extended
beyond the fact situation before the Supreme Court when it adopted that presumption.
When the Supreme Court adopted the presumption, the copyrighted works at issue
were movies. A copyright on a movie is likely to protect the value of the movie far more
than a copyright on a computer program protects the value of the program. The market
power derived from a copyright on a computer program is substantially less than the
market power derived from a copyright on a movie.
Third, courts should not presume market power where a computer program is
copyrighted because such a presumption will deter individuals from seeking copyright
protection for computer programs. Part III will illustrate that presumption's deterrent
effect on seeking copyright protection will not increase pro-competitive activity. More-
over, forcing individuals to seek trade secret protection rather than copyright protection
will decrease the amount of knowledge available to the public and harm the public
interest. Thus, Part III concludes that this deterrent effect on seeking copyright protec-
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don and the subsequent harm to the public, coupled with the failure of the presumption
to aid competition, and the minimal market power derived from a copyright on a
computer program support an argument for abandoning the presumption.
I. TYING AGREEMENTS AND COPYRIGHT LAW
From an early point in the development of antitrust law, courts have observed that
a tying agreement serves little purpose, except to restrain competition." Because most
tying agreements have anti-competitive effects, they are per se illega1. 14 Thus, tying
agreements may violate the Sherman or the Clayton antitrust laws.*
0 A tying agreement can violate either section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton
Act. Section I of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § I (1982). Section 3 of the
Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption, or resale within the'United States or any Territory thereof or the District
of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such
price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities of a competitor or. competititors of the lessor or seller, where
the effect or such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce,
15 U.S.C. 14 (1982). Although section 3 of the Clayton Act does not explicitly refer to tying
agreements, the Supreme Court held that this provision applies to such agreements. International
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134-36 (1936).
Courts once held that the definition of a tying agreement under the Sherman Act was different
from the definition of a tying agreement under the Clayton Act, but have now abandoned this
distinction. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v, International Business Mach. Corp., 448 F. Supp.,
228, 230 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (discussing old distinctions but noting that definitions are now the same),
aff 'd, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. f 980) (per curiam). Despite this differentiation, presently the definition
of a tying agreement is the same under both Acts. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 23-24 n.39 (1984). One important distinction between the two acts must be noted. The
Clayton Act only applies to tangible articles — "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities"; it does not apply to services or intangibles. 15 U.S.C. § 14; Crossland v. Canteen
Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 718 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The Clayton Act requires that both the tying and
the tied products be goods"). On the other hand, the Sherman Act applies to intangibles, services,
and tangibles. 15 U.S.C, § 1; Crossland, 711 F.2d at 718 n.l. See also Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 4-
5.
A private party can bring suit under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1982). This section also provides for the mandatory recovery of treble damages, costs, and
attorney's fees. Id. Additionally, under this section a court may award interest running from the
date that the suit was filed. Id.
14 Northern Par,., 356 U.S. at 6 ("Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition") (quoting Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S, 293,
305-06 (1949)).
"Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9 ("It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence
to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling
competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.'"). See W. HOLM S, supra note 9, at 8.02. In
recent years the per se rule has come under considerable criticism. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466
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When a tying agreement is challenged, however, the first question is not whether
the agreement has pro- or anti-competitive effects but rather, whether the agreement is
the type of agreement that gives rise to per se illegality. To establish that a tying
agreement is per se illegal, three elements must be present. i 6 First, the agreement must
involve two different products," the purchase of one of which is conditioned on the
purchase of the other. 18 Second, the tying product must have enough market power to
restrain competition in the tied product. 19 The ability to raise prices above what could
be charged in a competitive market may evidence market or economic power. 2° Third,
the agreement must affect a substantial amount of commerce in the tied product. 2 '
U.S. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (the concurrence joined by three other Justices urged the
abandonment of the per se rule for tying agreements).
"' Some courts have subdivided the elements to create as many as five requirements. See, e.g.,
Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1980) {court found five elements necessary to
the proof of an illegal tying agreement including a tying and tied product, evidence of actual
coercion, market power, anticompetitive effects in the tied market, and involvement of a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in tied market).
"Compare ILC Peripherals, 448 F. Supp. at 233-34 (incorporation of head/disk assembly into
disk drive is a single product), with Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d
55, 61 (4th Cir. 1969) (copy machines and copy supplies are different products), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 920 (1970). The Jefferson Parish Court stated that whether one or two products existed
depended upon the character of the consumer demand for those items. 466 U.S. at 19. See infra
notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
1,
 Conditioning, sometimes referred to as coercion, may be evidenced in several ways. It may
be shown by a written agreement that requires the purchase of one product before another can be
bought. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984). Threats that require the buyer to take a certain product or else
be terminated also may constitute conditioning. See id. In addition to the above two clear examples
of conditioning, conditioning may also occur in a more subtle form. Technological conditioning
occurs when the manufacturer specifically designs two items so they cannot be sold separately. To
establish this type of conditioning, it must be shown that the products were specifically designed to
create a tie and that the design served no technological purpose. See id. at 542-43. Economic
conditioning occurs when the seller offers the items separately and as a package but the price of
the separate items is such that a buyer would only realistically purchase the package. See Advanced
Business Sys., 415 F.2d at 62. For further discussion of the conditioning requirement, see Response
of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 527 F.2d 1307, 1327-28 (5th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Marathon
Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395, 398, 401 (6th Cir. 1976).
'' See Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 6-7. An often used example of market power was first given
by the Northern Pac. Court. To illustrate the absence of market power that Court stated: "[I]f one
of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar
it would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were ready and able to sell
flour by itself." Id. at 7.
'° United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (Fortner II).
The Farther II case is the leading case in the area of defining market power. In Fortner II, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant improperly tied the sale of prefabricated houses to credit. Id.
at 611. The Court held that the defendant did not have the requisite economic power in the credit
market. Id. at 622. In discussing market power, the Court noted that:
[The market power element does] not require that the defendant have a monopoly
or even a dominant position throughout the market for a tying product. [It does],
however, focus attention on the question whether the seller has the power, within the
market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept
burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.
Id. at 620.
21 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16; Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 6. This element is easily established.
Rather than looking to market shares for the tied product, courts simply require a sufficient amount
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If these three elements are established, courts will hold a tying agreement per se
illegal. In such a case, the courts will not inquire into market shares and the pro- and
anti-competitive effects of the agreement. 22 If, however, any of the three elements are
absent, the tying agreement would not be illegal per se. A court might nevertheless find
such an agreement to be illegal under a rule of reason analysis. 23 This analysis balances
the tying agreement's beneficial and detrimental effects on competition and requires
an in depth look into market shares. Therefore, to avoid the uncertainties, expense, and
difficulty of a rule of reason case, antitrust plaintiffs usually allege that the agreement
at issue falls under the per se classification rather than the rule of reason. 25 To establish
that a tying agreement fits into the per se classification, plaintiffs must show that the
three aforementioned elements are present.
While the first and third elements required to render a tying agreement per se
illegal — two different products sold only together and a substantial effect on commerce
— are relatively straightforward, the second element — market power — may be more
complex. There are three different ways to establish market power in a tying product.
First, market power exists when the defendant has a dominant position in the tying
market." Such a situation would be present, for example, with a company like Eastman
Kodak in the photographic film industry. 27 Second, a plaintiff can demonstrate the
defendant's market power when a substantial number of individuals accept the tie and
there is no logical reason for that acceptance other than the tying agreement itself."
of commerce of the tied product in dollar terms. The dollar amount required to establish this
element is usually small in comparison with the total sales of the parties involved in the litigation.
See, e.g., Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) (Fortner I)
($200,000 established third element); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) ($60,000
established third element); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395 (1947)
($500,000 established third element). From a practical standpoint, it is unlikely that anyone would
expend the time and money to bring suit against a party whose conduct was not affecting a
substantial amount of commerce. Even with treble damages and attorney's fees, the award would
probably not be great enough to induce a party to sue in light of the large expense associated with
litigation.
22 Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 5.
25
 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29; Foremost, 703 F.2d at 541.
24 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers,
620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir, 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981) ("A rule of reason analysis
requires a determination of whether an agreement is on balance an unreasonable restraint of trade,
that is, whether its anti-competitive effects outweigh its pro-competitive effects."). See also Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. at 29.
25 See Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 5. Frequently a plaintiff will not even allege a rule of reason
violation. See, e.g., Foremost, 703 F.2d at 541.
"Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26. In Jefferson Parish, the Court found that a 30% market share
was insufficient to establish market power. Id. at 26-27. See Kingsport Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 644 F.2d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 1981) (court found that Chrysler did not have sufficient
dominance in medium priced automobile market to show market power); see also Moore v. James
H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that market dominance can
establish the market power element of per se illegality). Although monopoly power or even market
dominance are not prerequisites for tying, their presence will establish the first element of per se
illegality. See supra note 20.
27 Cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing
Kodak's market power in monopolization context rather than tying context), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980).
2t!
	 II, 429 U.S. at 618 n.10; Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir.
1976).
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Third, a plaintiff can establish market power when the tying product is unique and
competitors are unable to offer a similar product."
Under the third method of establishing uniqueness in order to show market power,
price and practical or legal reasons can make a tying product unique and thus establish
market power. If a tying product is substantially cheaper than competing products, it is
unique." Additionally, a product is unique if there are no substitutes for it because the
defendant's competition lacks the technical ability to produce any. ," Finally, a product is
also unique when potential competitors are legally precluded from making a substitute
product. Because this situation occurs when the tying product is patented or copy-
righted," courts have held that a patent or copyright on the tying product raises a
presumption that there is sufficient market power in the tying product to meet the
market power requirement (the second element) of the per se illegality test."
Although there are numerous cases in which courts have found market power where
the tying product was patented, 34 very few cases involving copyrights exist." In 1948 in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 36 the Supreme Court first addressed a challenge
to a tying agreement in which the tying product was copyrighted. The defendant in
Paramount had engaged in block-booking." Block-booking involves the sale of a block
or group of films. The group of film in Paramount contained some very good films and
some very poor films. Under the block-booking arrangement, in order to get the good
films an exhibitor had to buy the entire group; individual films were not available."
Thus, Paramount conditioned the purchase of good films, the tying product, on the
purchase of poor films, the tied product. Because the films were copyrighted, the lower
court analogized the situation to patent misuse cases where courts have held that a patent
owner tying the use of a patent in the purchase of nonpatented products misuses the
29 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17; Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 621.
3" See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 622 (a unique product gives rise to market power if the seller had
a cost advantage over its competitors or is able to offer the product on terms that competitors could
not offer if they so desired). See supra note 20.
3 ' See supra note 20. This situation can occur when the defendant has a trade secret. See M.
JAGER, supra note 4, at § 1 1.03[6].
"Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 505 n.2.
"Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. The concurrence in Jefferson Parish stated that such a pre-
sumption did not arise. Id. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Trade secrets have never given
rise to a presumption of market power. 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359
(E.D. Mich. 1984). See M. JAGER, supra note 4, at 11.03[6]. Jager asserts that because trade secret
protection does not preclude anyone from practicing the secret, but only prevents a wrongful
taking, it should not give rise to a presumption of market power. Id.
The vast majority of cases hold that a trademark does not create a presumption of economic
power. 3 P.M., Inc., 591 F. Supp. at 1359; see generally W. HOLMES, supra note 9, at 1§ 34.01-34.03
(discussion of per se illegality and defenses). In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972), the Ninth Circuit held that a trademark did create
a presumption of market power. This decision has been severely criticized. See, e.g., W. LIEBELER,
ANTITRUST ADVISER § 2.13 (Supp. 1984). The presumption of market power has also been applied
to land. See Northern Pat., 356 U.S. at 7.
74 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
I (1912)); 2 R. NORDHAUS, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW § 65 (3d ed. 1984).
" See W. Houvms, supra note 9, at § 36.01.
56 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
" Id. at 156.
3" Id. at 156-57.
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patent because the patent owner in effect has extended the patent to an unpatented
product. 39 Based on this analogy, the lower court found Paramount's block-booking
arrangement to be an illegal tie because the copyright established Paramount's sufficient
market power in the good films to restrain competition in the poor films."
The Supreme Court approved this analogy.'" The Court, however, did not focus on
the scope of a copyright holder's exclusive rights or whether those rights created greater
or lesser economic power than a patent's rights. Rather, the Court focused on the
underlying purpose of copyright law." The Court noted that "[t]he sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."" The Court further
noted that, like the patent statute, the reward to authors was only a secondary objective
of copyright law." The Court then stated that "the reward does not serve its public
purpose if it is not related to the quality of the copyright."" Essentially, the Paramount
Court condemned the block-booking arrangement because it extended the scope and
value of one copyright to another copyright." The limitation that the Court placed on
its holding further supports this conclusion: "All we hold to be illegal is a refusal to
license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted.""
The Court's analysis resembles the analysis of courts in patent package license
agreement cases." A package license agreement involves the collective licensing of several
39 See id. at 157 (quoting from lower court's opinion). As examples of patent misuse cases the
Supreme Court cited Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S, 661, 665 (1944); Morton
Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S.
436, 459 (1940).
In Ethyl Gasoline the patentee had entered into license agreements that fixed the resale price
of the patentee's products. 309 U.S. at 458. The license agreements were used to regulate prices
and markets of the retailers. Id. at 458.
In Morton Salt the Court was not presented with an antitrust claim, but rather, only with a
patent infringement action. 314 U.S. at 490. The Court held that when a patent owner tied the use
of a patent to the purchase of nonpatented articles, the patent owner misuses the patent. Id. at 494.
The Court further held that misuse prevented the patent owner from enforcing the patent against
anyone regardless of whether that person suffered from the misuse. Moreover, the Court specifically
declined to decide whether the antitrust laws were violated, Id.
In Mercoid, the Supreme Court addressed a patent dispute involving the allegation that the
patent in question was improperly extended by an exclusive licensing agreement. Mercoid, 320 U.S.
at 662-63. The specific holding in Mercoid has been legislatively overturned. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c),
(d) (1982); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199-202 (1980) (discussing
Mercoid in light of § 27I(d)). Nevertheless, the portion of the Mercoid decision relied upon by the
Paramount Court remains viable. In this section, the Court stated that the dominant interest in the
patent system was the public interest. Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665. The Court also explained that any
extension of the patent's rights would deny the patent owner the right to enforce the patent. Id. at
665-66.
40 1d.
41 334 U.S. at 158.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id,
33 Id.
46 Id.
37 Id. at 159.
33
 For a good discussion of package license agreements, see 2 R. NORDHAUS, supra note 34, at
§§71-74.
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patents under one agreement. Plaintiffs have challenged some of these agreements as
patent misuse when one or more of the patents expire before the license agreements
do. If the royalty rate under the license agreement does not decrease as the patents
expire, arguably the patent owner is using the non-expired patents to extend the scope
of the expired patents." Such an extension constitutes patent misuse if the licensee was
forced into the agreement and the agreement was not necessary for the convenience of
the parties. 5° Therefore, the same basic wrong — the use of one item's exclusive right
to expand another item's exclusive right — is at the base of both the package license
cases and the Paramount Court's copyright analysis.
Patent misuse, however, only renders the patent and the license agreement unen-
forceable; it does not automatically give rise to an antitrust violation." Rather, after a
4" The Supreme Court ruled, in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964), that "a patentee's
use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per
se," and that royalties accrued after the last of the patents used in the machines expired could not
be collected. In Brulotte, the owner of patents for hop-picking devices sold machines incorporating
some of those patents to farmers for a fiat sum and issued a license with each sale requiring payment
of royalties for a period continuing after the last patent on the machines expired. Id. at 29-30.
The owner of the patents sued when the farmers refused to pay royalties accruing both before
and after the expiration of the patents. The farmers raised the defense of patent misuse based on
the licensor's extension of the license agreements beyond the expiration date of the patents. The
license agreements listed twelve patents, although only seven were used in the machines. Of those
seven, all expired on or before 1957, although the license agreements extended beyond that date.
Id. at 30. The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Bralotte licenses drew no line between the
term of the patent and the post-expiration period and that the provisions regarding royalties and
use remained the same. Id. at 31-32. Therefore, the Court found that the agreements were "a bald
attempt to exact the same terms and conditions for the period after the patents have expired as
they do for the monopoly period" and held such a royalty agreement illegal. Id. at 32.
Brulone, however, does not stand for the proposition that all package license agreements
constitute misuse. In Bralotle all the patents expired before the license agreement ended; the Court,
however, stated no objection to a royalty rate remaining the same when some, but less than all, of
the patents used in the machine expired before the license agreement. See It at 33. See also Hensley
Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1967); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical
Elev. Corp., 433 F,2d 55, 61 (7th Cir. 1970) (upholding package license agreement with fixed royalty
rate that expired when the last patent covered by the agreement expired), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976
(1971); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965) (same); Leesona
Corp. v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
5° Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) (Forced package
licensing gives rise to patent misuse even if the agreement expires before the last patent.). Rocform
Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 1966); American Sec.
Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 771 (3rd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 697-98 (D.S.C. 1977), cert, denied, 444
U.S. 1015 (1980).
5 ' Misuse is only used as a defense to a patent infringement action. It does not give rise to an
independent cause of action. Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885,
892-93 (D. Mass. 1980), aff 'd, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981) (on appeal the court dealt with issues
of contract fraud and recovery of royalties).
The starting point for an analysis of the relationship between antitrust and patent law is Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). The Walker Process Court
held that enforcing a fraudulently procured patent could result in a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2
(Sherman Act monopolization section). Id. at 174. The Court reasoned that proof of a fraudulently
procured patent would strip the patentee of his exemption from the antitrust laws. Id, at 177.
In addition to proving fraud, the Walker Process Court stated that the accusing party must
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court finds patent misuse it must subject the agreement to a separate antitrust analysis
to determine if it is illega1. 52 In essence, the Paramount Court used the underlying
rationale of patent misuse, a doctrine that prevents a patent owner from enforcing a
patent when the patent owner uses the patent in a manner contrary to public policy, to
impose antitrust liability and treble damages in a copyright case." Moreover, the Para-
mount Court subjected the defendant to antitrust liability without going through a sep-
arate antitrust analysis — a determination of whether the copyright on the tying film
prevented competitors from offering similar films. 54
The Supreme Court, in its 1962 decision in United States v. Loew's inc.," did not
forego an independent antitrust analysis as had. the Paramount Court. In Loew's the Court
was again presented with a block-booking arrangement." The facts differed from those_
in Paramount because the films were being licensed to television stations rather than
movie theaters." The Court found that this difference was immaterial, however, and
held that the block-booking arrangements were illegal tying agreements under the second
part of the three part test." In imposing antitrust liability, the Loew's Court did not rely
establish the other elements of a § 2 claim. Id. at 174. Those elements consist of: 1) monopoly
power in the relevant market, and 2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power — monop-
olistic intent. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Norton Co., 210 U.S.P.Q. 94, 114-15 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,. 570-71 (1973)). Additionally, the accusing party
must be damaged by the enforcement of the fraudulently procured patent. Walker Process, 382 U.S.
at 178.
Finally, the Walker Process Court declined to cla issify enforcement of a fraudulently procured
patent as a per se antitrust violation. Id. at 178. Nevertheless, it has been argued that Walker Process
left the question of per se illegality open. The Federal Circuit reflected this argument in American
Hoist & Derrick Co. v, Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1984) stating:
The patent system, which antedated the, Sherman Act by a century, is not an
"exception" to the antitrust laws, and patent rights are not legal monopolies in the
antitrust sense of that word. Accordingly, if is patent is held to have been obtained
illegally, it is not properly said, ipso facto, that it was all along an illegal monopoly and,
thus, that its procurement and attempted enforcement was a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. A holding that monopoly analysis should end in favor of liability on a
determination of fraud, without more, would signal a fundamental misunderstanding
of the substance and purposes of both the patent and the antitrust laws.
(emphasis in original). This statement evidences the Federal Circuit's pro-patent position. . The
statement is also noteworthy becaUse the Federal Circuit disregards the "exception to the antitrust
law" language of Walker Process. See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177. While Walker Process and American
Hoist & Derrick both address patent fraud and not misuse, their rationale can nevertheless be applied
to misuse situations.
The court in Transitron discussed the two differences between misuse and antitrust violations.
487 F. Supp. at 892, First, to show misuse a party does not have to prove anticompetitive effects.
Second, to establish misuse, a party does not have to prove that it was harmed. These distinctions
make proving misuse easier than proving an antitrust violation. Id.; see Duplan Corp, v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 673 (D.S.C. 1977) (finding misuse but no antitrust violation),
modified, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
52 It is not uncommon in a case having both antitrust and patent infringement issues for those
issues to be tried separately. See, e.g., Brandt, Inc. v.:Crane, 97 F.R.D. 707 (D.D. Ill, 1983).
57 See supra note 13.
54 See supra note 20.
5' 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962).
56 id. at 39.
57 Id. at 40.
5' Id. at 48.
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directly on the fact that the defendant's actions were convoluting the policy behind
copyrights. 59
 Rather, the Court scrutinized the agreement in an antitrust context.
The Loew's Court initially observed that it disfavored tying agreements for two
reasons. First, tying agreements "may force buyers into giving up the purchase of
substitutes for the tied product."6° Second, tying agreements "may destroy the free access
of competing suppliers of the tied product to the consuming market." 61 The Court next
stated that to impose liability for a tying agreement, however, the seller must have
sufficient market power in the tying product to restrainappreciably free competition in
the tied product's market. 52 The Court held that this market power was presumed
present when the tying product was patented or copyrighted.° The Court justified this
presumption as a natural extension of the patent misuse doctrine.° The Court further
noted that the presumption of uniqueness for patented products logically flows from
the patent law's objective of rewarding uniqueness.° The Loew's Court then reaffirmed
the Paramount Court's application of the patent misuse rationale to copyright antitrust
cases." Like Paramount, the Loew's Court never compared the scope of patent rights with
the scope of copyright rights. Therefore, the Court offered no grounds for its assumption
that a copyright creates the same coercive economic power as a patent. Nevertheless, in
light of Loew's and Paramount, courts now presume that when the tying product is
copyrighted, the requisite market power to establish per se illegality is present.
In summary, a tying agreement occurs whenever the purchase of one product is
conditioned on the purchase of another. Such agreements are per se antitrust violations
if three elements are present: the agreements involve two separate products and the
purchase of one product is conditioned on the purchase of the other, sufficient market
power in the tying product exists such that the tying agreement restrains competition in
the tied product, and the agreement affects a substantial amount of commerce in the
tied product's market. Furthermore, when the tying product is copyrighted, courts
presume the necessary market power is present in the tying product. Thus, if the tying
product is copyrighted, an antitrust plaintiff must establish only the first and third
elements to render the agreement illegal per se.
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS — ANTITRUST EFFECTS
In light of the foregoing analysis, a company selling software (computer programs)
and hardware (computers, video games, robots, or toys) only as an integrated unit or
59 The Court, nevertheless, did use the policy behind copyright law to justify the presumption
of market power. Id. at 46.
60 1d, at 45.
61 Id.
92 Id.
" Id. at 45-46. Interestingly, the Paramount Court never stated that a copyright raised the
presumption of market power.
' Id. at 46.
65 Id. at 46. The Court reasoned that because an item must be unique to be patentable, 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1982), the item should also be unique for the purposes of antitrust laws. Id. This
reasoning ignores the fact that an item can be unique in the patent sense of the word and yet totally
worthless because of similar non-infringing substitutes, from an economic point of view. Moreover,
it is the economic worth that is crucial to an antitrust analysis and determination of uniqueness. Cf.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78 (declining to find that a patent was a relevant market in itself
because there could have been non-infringing substitutes for the patent).
66 371 U.S. at 46-47 (quoting Paramount, 534 U.S. at 158).
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package, must consider seriously the antitrust ramifications of copyrighting its pro-
grams.° In such packages, the software would be the tying product and the hardware
would be the tied product. Thus, a copyright on the company's computer programs
would establish the presumption of market power in the tying product. The presumption
would then force the company to base its defense in an antitrust suit on either the
absence of the first element for per se illegality — separate products with one's purchase
conditioned on the other's — or on the absence of the third element for per se illegality
— substantial effect on commerce in the tied product.
At first glance, this situation does not appear to create any great inequity for the
company with a copyright on a computer program. It still has two means to show that
per se illegality is not established. A brief examination of the first and third elements in
the per se illegality test illustrates, however, that few companies selling computer hard-
ware and software as packages could effectively defend themselves by establishing the
absence of either of these elements. After a close analysis of the interrelation of software
and hardware and the rationale behind extending copyright protection to software, it is
apparent that in the vast majority of software/hardware packages offered for sale, two
separate products exist. Thus, a plaintiff could easily establish the first element of per
se illegality, that the defendant is selling two products with the purchase of one condi-
tioned on the purchase of the other. Moreover, although the language of the third
element — requiring the tying agreement to affect a substantial amount of commerce —
creates the impression of demanding large volumes of sales in the tied product's market,
courts have required relatively small amounts of sales to establish that element." Thus,
it is likely that this element also will be present in a software/hardware package arrange-
ment. With the first and third elements of per se illegality established rather easily, the
presumption of market power by virtue of the copyright, which establishes the second
element of per se illegality, becomes critical. 69
In evaluating whether software and hardware are two separate products under the
first element of the per se illegality test, it initially appears that the products are so
interrelated that they are not two products, but rather, one. A computer without a
program is a lifeless mass of wires and circuits that performs no function," other than
taking up space on your desk. Likewise a program is nothing more than a series of
strange words" or magnetic impulses representing open and closed switches: 72 The
program is valueless and functionless unless it is used in a computer. Thus, the conclusion
67
 Tying problems only arise when the seller refuses to offer the items in the package separately.
Thus, there is nothing illegal in offering a package of items, if the items are also available individ-
ually. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12 & n.18.
" See supra note 21.
" However, one other means of defending a tying claim exists. The business justification
defense provides that when the two products will not properly work independently of one another
or if they can not be made independently then there is no antitrust violation. See, e.g., Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.) (applying defense to manufacturer of
patented silo unloading devices), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961). This defense is applied only in
very unique situations, see W. Holmes supra note 9, at 20.93, and was rejected in both cases dealing
with computer program copyrights discussed infra notes 87-115 and accompanying text.
Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: the view from '79, 7 COMPUTERS, TECH, L.
269, 271, 273 (1980).
7 ' For example, higher-level languages such as BASIC, FORTRAN, and Pt.l appear similar to a
set of instructions expressed in literary form. Id. at 272.
72 See id. at 271.
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seems inescapable that a computer and its program are one product inexplicably united.
Such a conclusion would prevent a finding of per se illegality because the first element
requires that two different products be involved.
The argument that a computer and its program are one product is flawed, however,
in two respects. First, a key hurdle that the courts and the legislature overcame in
granting copyright protection to computer programs was the determination that the
program was separate and distinct from the computer." If the program was only a part
of the computer, analogous to a cam in a machine, it would not be copyrightable."
Copyright only protects works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium." Parts of a
machine and processes are not protectable because such protection would give rise to
the protection of ideas, which the copyright statute expressly prohibits." Thus, Congress
and the courts in granting copyright protection to programs implicitly established that
programs were distinct products from computers.
Second, even if the implication that software and hardware are separate products
for copyright purposes cannot be applied in an antitrust context, courts would find a
program and a computer to be different products for tying purposes. The test to
determine whether there are different products in a tying situation is not based upon
the functional relationship of the products. That a computer is worthless without a
program and vice versa" is irrelevant to the judicial determination of whether two
different products exist in the context of a tying agreement. Rather, courts base the test
for determining whether one product or different products are present upon the char-
acter of the demand for those products.
The Supreme Court announced the character of the demand test in 1984 in Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde. 78 In Jefferson Parish, the Court found that hospital
operating room services and anesthesiological services were different services for anti-
trust purposes." In so finding, the Court specifically rejected the argument that only
one service existed because they were functionally integrated; 8° no one would undergo
surgery without an anesthetic. The Court instead adopted the character of demand
test." Under that test, the Court considers whether purchasers of the items perceive the
items as one product or two. In applying the test, the Court examined the actual practices
of the health care industry. The Court noted that hospitals bill operating room and
anesthesiological services separately and that surgeons often request specific anesthe-
- 73 See, e.g., Williams Elms:, Inc. v. Arctic Intl, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1982); Cosrro,
supra note I, at 21.
CONTU, supra note 1 , ,at 29 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting).
73
 17 U.S.C. § IO2(a) (1982).
76 Id. § 102(b); 37 C.F.R. 202.1(b) (1986); see 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[D].
77
 Supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
78
 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984).
79 Id. at 23.
1,0 Id. at 19. In a footnote the Court affirmatively cited a number of cases where it found illegal
tying agreements "involving functionally linked products at least one of which is useless without
the other , ." Id. at 19 n.30. For example, the Court cited "International Business Machines Corp.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 56 S. Ct. 701, 80 Led. 1085 (1936) (computer and computer punch
cards)." 466 U.S. at 19 n.30.
el Id. at 19.
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siologists. 82 Even though one service was useless without the other, the Court concluded
that the two services were different under the antitrust laws,"
Thus, under the Jefferson Parish character of demand test, software and hardware
would be different products because consumers purchase hardware and software from
different sources; they therefore would perceive the items as two products." In addition,
evidence of the large number of firms that only produce software" would further
support the conclusion that consumers regard software and hardware as two separate
products. In sum, a plaintiff suing a company that sells packages of hardware and
software could show easily that two separate products are involved, thereby establishing
the first element of per se illegality of the tying arrangement.
Interestingly, although the Jefferson Parish case concerned health care services, the
Court noted in dicta that a copyright presumptively establishes market power." There-
fore, after Jefferson Parish, a company that markets its copyrighted programs and hard-
ware as a package would have difficulty avoiding per se illegality. The program and the
computer would be two different products. The copyright on the program would create
the presumption that the program had the requisite market power to establish per se
illegality. In all likelihood, the hardware sales would be sufficient to establish a substantial
effect on commerce.
The seller's only remaining way to avoid per se illegality would be not to condition
the purchase of its software on its hardware. The lack of conditioning would avoid the
first element of per se illegality, which has two components: different products and
conditioning. Nevertheless, this solution is no solution at all. By not conditioning the
purchase of software on the purchase of hardware, the company would lose any economic
or strategic value it sought to establish by marketing the items as a package. At best, the
company could market the package until a customer requested one of the products
without the other. The company would then have to sell the single item or run the
substantial risk of an antitrust violation with its attendent treble damage awards."'
Data General Corporation elected to take that risk and lost. In 19134 in Digidyne
Corp. v. Data General Corp.," the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Data
General's marketing policies were per se illegal. Data General had refused to license its
copyrighted programs without its hardware." The Ninth Circuit in Data General ap-
87 Id. at 22. The practices of the seller, separate billing and bookkeeping, would be relevant to
the character of demand because those practices would help shape the purchasers perception of
the products.
83 Id. at 24.
" See, e.g., Gilburne, The Use of Escrow for Source Code and Technical Design Specifications in OEM
Transactions, COMPUTER Law., March, 1984, at 1 (discussion of OEM's (Original Equipment Man-
ufacturers) buying practices); Davis, IBM PC Software and Hardware Compatibility, COMPUTER LAW.,
July, 1984, at 11 (discussing how to legally make IBM PC compatable software).
85 See MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software — an Update and Practical Synthesis, 20 Hous. L.
REV. 1033, 1033 (1983).
"6 466 U.S. at 16 (citing United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1962)). The concurrence,
however, rejected this proposition. Id. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87 See supra note 13.
" 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985) (White, J., and
Blackman, J., dissenting) (noting that substantial questions existed regarding the effect legal mon-
opolies had on market power arid the importance of this question to the computer industry), rev'g
In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Data II).
" Id.
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proved an earlier decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California (Data I)90 that granted summary judgment against Data General on the
first and third elements of a per se claim." After granting summary judgment on those
two counts, the district court then held a trial on the second element. 92
The jury found that Data General had the requisite market power in the tying
product, operating systems software, and thus found the tying agreement illegal per
se." The district court, however, in a subsequent opinion (Data II) overturned the jury
verdict and granted Data General a judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The district
court found that the presumption of market power, which arises when a product is
copyrighted, did not apply to copyrighted computer programs." The district court
decided this case prior to the cases that extended copyright protection to operating
systems programs." Thus, the district court was uncertain if copyright law protected the
programs at issue, which were operating systems programs. If the programs' copyrights
were invalid, they would not give rise to a presumption of market power. 97 Furthermore,
the district court held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that the
9° In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (Data 1).
9L 734 F.2d at 1338-39 (citing Data I, 490 F. Supp. 1089). In Data I the district court granted
summary judgment on the issue of separate products finding that Data General's programs and
hardware were distinct products. Data I, 490 F. Supp. at 1106. The court termed the test it used
to make that determination the "function of the aggregation." Id. at 1104. This would appear to
be rejected by Jefferson Parish, see supra note 79-82 and accompanying text; however, as the Ninth
Circuit correctly noted, Data Gen., 734 F.2d at 1339, the test used in Data I was actually the same
as the character of the demand test articulated in Jefferson Parish. But see Reback, Further Reflection
on Data General and the Law of Pricing Unbundled Products, COMPUTER LAw., March, 1984, at 1, 3
(arguing that Data I test was rejected by Jefferson Parish but that under thefefferson Parish character
of demand test the same result would have occurred). In making the separate products determi-
nation, the Data I court noted that "the relevant inquiry is not whether the two items must be used
together but whether they must come from the same seller." Data I, 490 F. Supp. at 1104. The Data
I court found that Data General's maintenance of separate price lists and marketing personnel for
software and hardware, and the marketing practices of the computer industry in general evidenced
that software and hardware were separate products. Id.
In granting summary judgment against Data General on the third element, the issue of
substantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied market, the court noted that any dollar
volume in hardware sales more than a de minimis amount would satisfy this requirement. Id. at
1117. In this case, Data General's hardware sales were $254,000,000 for 1977. Id. This large volume
of sales demonstrates the rapid growth of the computer industry; Data General started out in the
back room of a beauty parlor in 1968. Johnston, Product Bundling Faces Increased Spector of Illegality
Under the Antitrust Laws, COMPUTER LAW., Sept., 1984, at 1. Data General's antitrust problem suggests
that any small but quickly growing computer firm could find itself in serious antitrust problems if
it chose to copyright its programs and market them in a package with its hardware.
" In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd sub nom.,
Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
"Id. at 804.
" Id. at 805.
95 Id. at 816.
" See supra note 3.
97 See Data II, 529 F. Supp. at 816; Data Gen., 734 F.2d at 1344 n.5. The district court did not
receive any evidence on the effect a copyright would have on the development of comparable
programs. Data II, 529 F. Supp. at 816. It should be noted, however, that an invalid copyright
could still be used to restrict competitors prior to its invalidation.
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copyright prevented others from producing similar programs to Data General's.• Thus,
the district court found that the plaintiffs did not establish that Data General's copy-
righted programs were unique, and therefore the court held that the plaintiffs did not
satisfy the second element of the per se illegality test — market power in the tying
product.99
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting Data General a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.. 100 The Ninth Circuit stated, "[d]efendant's [pro-
gram] has copyright protection .... The [program's] copyright established both the
distinctiveness of [the program] and a legal bar to its reproduction by competitors. The
requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copy-
righted."'" The Ninth Circuit held that in light of this presumption, the district court
had erroneously placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff. 102
 instead, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the copyright created a presumption of sufficient market power to render
the tying agreement illegal per se.'" Furthermore, the Data General court placed the
burden to rebut that presumption on the defendant.'" Therefore, the Ninth Circuit,
holding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Data General
had the requisite market power, reinstated the jury's verdict.'"
Thus, the Ninth Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Paramount and Loew's, blindly
extended the doctrine that a copyright presumptively creates the requisite market power
for per se illegality. The court concluded that sufficient market power in the copyrighted
software was present without analyzing the scope of the rights granted under a copyright,
the effect those rights would have in creating sufficient market power to restrain corn-
" Data II, 529 F. Supp. at 816. This is a very interesting holding because the court instructed
the jury that: Iclopyright protection is presumed to constitute ... a legal barrier, and ... the
burden is on defendant to rebut that presumption by proving that its copyrights have not prevented
others from developing the distinctive product themselves." Id. at 811.
99 Id, at 816.
I'm Data Gen., 734 F.2d at 1339.
101 Id. at 1341 (quoting Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45).
192 Id. at 1344.
", Id. Although the programs contained trade secrets and purchasers were locked in to pur-
chasing Data General's equipment because of computability requirements, id. at 1343, the court
clearly relied on the presumption of market power arising from the copyright to support its holding,
Id. at 1344.
Id. Practically, a defendant could never meet this burden. First, the defendant has the always
difficult task of proving a negative — that the copyright did not create market power. Second, the
court states that proof of competing substitutes is insufficient to rebut the presumption. Id. at 1345
(quoting Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49).
In addition, the problem with placing the burden on the defendant is that it will deprive the
defendant of summary judgment. There will usually be disputed factual issues regarding whether
the defendant rebutted the presumption of market power. Alternatively, if there were no pre-
sumption, and thus the plaintiff had the burden of proving market power, the situation could arise
where the plaintiff could not present any evidence of market power. See, e.g., 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic
Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (ED. Mich. 1984). (Plaintiff did not know and did not attempt
to prove defendant's market position.) In this situation, with the burden on the plaintiff, summary
judgment would be granted to the defendant. Moreover, it does not follow that if the burden were
switched to the defendant, that the defendant would be entitled to summary judgment. This result
would occur because of the inherent problems in proving a negative.
10, Id. at 1346-47.
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petition, and the differences in market power arising out of a copyright on a computer
program as opposed to a movie.
Only one court has thus far grappled with these salient issues." In 1984 in 3 P.M.,
Inc. v. Bask Four Corp.," the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan considered a situation very similar to that in Data General. The 3 P.M. court,
however, granted summary judgment for the defendant." Although the defendant's
computer programs were copyrighted," the court held that the plaintiff, as a matter of
law, failed to establish the requisite market power to impose per se illegality."° The 3
P.M. court held that a copyright did not create a presumption of market power.'
Moreover, the court stated that a copyright alone failed to establish that the computer
programs were unique." 2
 The court distinguished the Supreme Court decisions in
Paramount and Loew's on the ground that both those cases were not based solely on the
fact that the films were copyrighted; rather, those cases also relied on other factors, such
as the themes, notoriety, and stars of the films."s The 3 P.M. court further reasoned
that the plaintiff could have avoided summary judgment by showing that the copyright
prevented the defendant's competitors from making a functionally equivalent pro-
gram." 4
 The court, however, doubted that the plaintiff could do this because a copyright
does not prohibit the making of functionally equivalent programs," 5 The 3 P.M. court
maintained that a copyright on a computer program doe; not establish the uniqueness
of the program and does not create a presumption of market power under the per se
illegality test applied to hardware/software package arrangements.
III. ABANDONMENT OF THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER FOR COPYRIGHTED
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The reasoning and result in 3 P.M. directly conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Data General, holding that the copyright on the defendant's computer program, the
tying product, created a presumption of the presence of the requisite market power to
render a tying arrangement per se illegal. The 3 P.M. court's rejection of the presump-
tion of market power is correct. Courts should abandon the presumption of market
power arising from a copyright for three reasons. First, courts should not have extended
the presumption of market power from patents to copyrights because patents create
greater market power than copyrights. Second, even if the extension of the presumption
from patents to copyrights were appropriate, courts should limit the presumption to
'(0
	two lower court decisions in Data General did not address these issues either. Another
court, in Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1470
(D.N.J. 1984), had the opportunity to address these, issues in the context of a copyrighted program
being tied to another copyrighted program; however, it never reached them. The Innovation court
instead found, alternatively, that there was either no coercion or only one product. Id. at 1475-76.
107
 591 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Mich. 1984). The holding of the 3 P.M. court was followed by a
court in Al. Boot Co. v. Computer Dynamics, Inc., No. C84-1348 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1985).
I°a'3 P.M., 591 F. Supp. at 1353.
Id. at 1359.
"D Id. at 1361.
ILI Id. at 1359 (quoting Data I, 490 F. Supp. at 1112).
1L2 Id.
'" Id. (quoting Loeuis, 371 U.S. at 48).
"' Id. at 1360.
15 See id.
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copyrights on movies and should not apply it to computer programs. Because a copyright
on a movie creates much greater market power than a copyright on a computer program,
a blanket rule of presuming market power in all copyright cases is illogical and ignores
the differences among product markets. Third, a presumption of market power in
computer program copyright cases is contrary to copyright law's objective of increasing
the overall availability of public information. The practical result of Data General will be
to force companies selling software to forego copyright protection and rely on other
forms of protection, such as trade secrets. Moreover, forcing companies to forego copy-
right protection will disproportionately affect smaller companies. For these three reasons,
courts should abandon the presumption that a copyright on a computer program pro-
vides the requisite market power to establish per se illegality.
A. Presumption of Market Power Was Incorrectly Extended from Patents to Copyrights
Patents provide greater rights of exclusion to patent owners and thus give rise to
greater market power than copyrights." A patent grants to the patent owner the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell an invention.'" Some authors have inaccurately
stated that patents protect ideas.''" Yet patents do not protect ideas: "9 rather, they protect
inventions, which are the embodiment of ideas as expressed in the patent's claims. 129
Thus, the scope of a patent's exclusive rights will depend on the nature of its claims. 121
na See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1975) (discussing
limited nature of copyright's exclusive rights); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Unlike a
patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the
expression of the idea — not the idea itself."); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49, 54 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand) ("though a copyright is ... less vulnerable than a patent, the owner's
protection is more limited"), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); Gemignani, supra note 70, at 276 (if
a program is patented it gets a broader scope of protection than if it is copyrighted); cf. Commis-
sioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522, 532 (1866) ("Patentees are a meritorious class,
and all the aid and protection which the law allows, this court will cheerfully give them.").
35 U.S.C, § 154 (1982) provides:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee,
his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, subject to the payment of fees as
provided for in this title, of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention throughout the United States, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof. A copy of the specification and drawings Shall be annexed to the
patent and be a part thereof.
118 E.g., Reback, supra note 91, at 4.
" 9 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting=Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)), In the Gottschalk case, the Court stated: "That statement followed
the longstanding rule that 'Wu idea of itself is not patentable." Id.; Gemignani, supra note 70, at
294.
12° See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.").
123 A patent owner enforces the patent's rights through an action for infringement. Anyone
who makes, uses or sells the invention during the term of the patent is-an infringer. Id. § 271. A
patent owner has a civil right of action against an infringer. Id. § 281. Through this civil action the
patent owner can obtain an injunction, id. § 283, and damages, id. § 284, from an infringer. The
damages will be at least a reasonable royalty and can include prejudgment interest. Id. § 284;
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) (upholding an award of $8,813,945.50
in damages based on a reasonable royalty and $11,022,954.97 in prejudgment interest).
The claims define the patentee's invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. Thus, to determine whether an
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Unlike a copyright holder, however, who is only protected for a single work, 122
 a patentee
infringement has occurred a court must look to the claims of the patent. Envirotech Corp. v. Al
George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Autogiro Co. of Am. v, United States, 384 F.2d
391, 395-96 (Ct. Ci. 1967), cited with approval in Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d
1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Autogiro decision contains an excellent discussion of how to make
an infringement determination. 384 F.2d at 395-97. The Autogiro court noted that although courts
are confined by the language of the claims, "[t]he lucidity of a claim is determined in light of what
ideas it is trying to convey. Only by knowing the idea, can one decide how much shadow encumbers
reality." Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 396; see Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1569. Thus, to determine the meaning
of the claims and consequently the scope of patent protection, a court can look to the drawings and
the specifications. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397; see Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1569. Quite often this is
essential because "patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer" that is, in the
specifications of the patent a patentee can define the meaning of the words used in the claims.
Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 397; Fromson, 720 F.2d at 1569. More importantly, however, the specifications
and the drawings can never be used to expand the claims. Autogiro, 384 F.2d at 398.
There are two types of infringements: literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents. See Atlas Powder Co. v. El. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 224 U.S.P.Q. 409, 415-
16 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Under both types of infringement the claims of the patent are controlling.
Literal infringement occurs when the claims literally describe the accused infringing device — the
patent claims A, B, and C and the infringing device has A, B, and C. See, e.g., Minerals Separation,
Ltd. v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U.S. 336 (1919) (patent claim placed a maximum limit
on the amount of oil in a process, Court found no infringement when accused process used more
oil than maximum limit stated in patent claims).
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents occurs when the accused device performs
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result," as the
invention claimed in the patent. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co,, 339 U.S. 605,
608 (1950) (finding manganese silicate and magnesium silicate equivalents) (quoting Machine Co.
v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)). Thus, if the patent claims A, B, and C and the accused
infringer uses A, B', and C the court must determine whether A, B', and C meet the test defined
in Graver Tank for equivalency and thus constitute an infringement. This doctrine of equivalents,
however, is only relied upon when literal infringement cannot be proved. Id. at 607.
All patent infringement cases regardless of what district they were brought in are now appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982). Following are some of
the decisions by the Federal Circuit regarding infringement, the doctrine  of equivalents, and
limitations on that doctrine (file wrapper estoppel or prosecution history estoppel) Jamesbury Corp.
v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 253, 259-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (infringement); Martin v.
Barber, 225 U.S.P.Q. 233, 235 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (doctrine of equivalents and infringement); Lemelson
v. United States, 224 U.S.P.Q. 526, 532-35 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (infringement and doctrine of equiva-
lents); Atlas Powder Co. v. El, Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 224 U.S.P.Q. 409, 415-16 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (infringement and doctrine of equivalents); Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389
(Fed. Cir, 1984) (prosecution history estoppel); Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp., 739 F.2d 1576,
1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (infringement); Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research B.V.,
738 F.2d 1237, 1242-43 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (prosecution history estoppel); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v.
Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (infringement and doctrine of equivalents);
Radio Steil & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc„ 731 F.2d 840, 847-48 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (doctrine of
equivalents); Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d 1476, 1480-86 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (infringe-
ment); Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 828-29 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(doctrine of equivalents); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547-48
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (willful infringement); Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., 726 F.2d 724, 728
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (reverse doctrine of equivalents); Thomas & Betts Corp, v. Litton Sys., 720 F.2d
1572, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (prosecution history estoppel); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351, 1363-66 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (prosecution history and file wrapper estoppel).
l22 Copyright protection extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to
reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies of the work, to
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is free to draft the claims and thus define the scope of protection as broadly as is possible
within the limits of the prior act. Thus the patentee's resulting right of exclusion under
a patent can be quite broad.' 2 "
A slice of history illustrates this distinction. Orville and Wilbur Wright invented the
first powered airplane. They received a patent on their invention on May 22, 1906. 124
In the patent they claimed the combination of an aeroplane, a horizontal rudder, and a
means for raising and lowering the rear edge of the rudder. 125 In effect, they claimed
an airplane's wings and elevators. This claim is broad enough to prevent anyone from
making, using, or selling an airplane. Moreover, the market power associated with this
right of exclusion is substantial. For example, if the patent was valid and in effect today, 12 "
Orville and Wilbur could prevent the making, using, and selling of any plane from a
Piper to a 747) 27
Now suppose that history was a little different; instead of being inventors, Orville
and Wilbur were authors. Further, suppose they wrote a novel about flying. In this nova"
they describe their airplane in such detail that after reading the novel one could suc-
cessfully build the machine. 12" Orville and Wilbur then copyright their novel but never
patent their airplane.
publicly perform the work, and to publicly display the work. Id. 106. Anyone who violates these
exclusive rights is an infringer and can be sued by the owner of the copyright for the violation of
those exclusive rights. Id. 501. The copyright owner can get an injunction, id. § 502, and profits
and damages, id. 1 504. Unlike patent law, copyright law also provides for criminal liability of an
infringer. Id. § 506.
To determine if' an accused work is infringing a copyrighted work, a court must determine if
the accused work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. The accused work will only be
able to violate one of the exclusive rights set down in § 106 if' it is substantially similar to the
copyrighted work. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d
Cir. 1983) (comparing Greatest American Hero television series and Superman); Eden Toys, Inc.
v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1982) (comparing Paddington Bear to
Fred Bear); Atari Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F,2d 607, 614-15 (7th
Cir.) (comparing home television K.C. Munchkin to electronic arcade game PAC-MAN), ceri. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v, McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
3157, 1165-67 (9th Cir. 1977) (comparing H,R. Pufnstuf television series and McDonald's T.V.
commercials). Compare Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 8l F.2d 49 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand)
(finding works substantially similar), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) with Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 1 19  (2(1 Cir. 1930) (L. Hand) (finding works not substantially similar). See
generally 3 M. NrMMER, supra note 3, at § 13.03 (discussion of substantial similarity). Therefore, in
determining if an infringement has occurred, the copyrighted work, itself, serves the same purpose
as the claims in a patent; it defines the scope of protection.
L2' See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (novelty requirement of patentability); 35 U.S.C. 1103 (1982)
(non-obviousness requirement of patentability).
124 0. & W. Wright, Patent No. 821,393, filed March 23, 1903, issued May 22, 1906 [hereinafter
Wright Patent].
125 id. at 7, claim 12. That claim provided:
12. In a flying-machine, the combination, with an aeroplane of a normally flat and
substantially horizontal flexible rudder, and means for curving said rudder rearwardly
and upwardly or rearwardly and downwardly with respect to its normal plane sub-
stantially as described.
12" The patent would have expired on May 21; 1923. See supra note 117.
I" See supra note 121. In reality the Wright Patent was never enforced through litigation nor
held invalid. For an example of patents that effectively covered any helicopter, see Autogiro, 384
F.2d at 391,
125 Assume that the description, if it had been used in a patent, would have met the requirements
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The rights they would acquire under copyright are quite different from those
acquired under patent. Under copyright law, only the novel, the embodiment of the
author's expression, would be protected. 129 Orville and Wilbur could not prevent some-
one from building and flying the airplane described in the novel.'" Moreover, they could
not even prevent others from writing about flying in airplanes.''' Therefore, the market
power flowing from these rights is substantially less than that which flowed from the
patent.' 32
The Supreme Court in 1879 in Baker v. Seldeni" used a similar hypothetical to
illustrate how the idea/expression dichotomy creates differences between patent and
copyright protection. The Baker Court stated,
The difference between the two things, letters-patent and copyright,
may be illustrated by reference to the subjects just enumerated. Take the
case of medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of great value in the
healing art. if the discoverer writes and publishes a book on the subject (as
regular physicians generally do), he gains no exclusive right to the manufac-
ture and sale of the medicine; he gives that to the public. If he desires to
acquire such exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for the mixture as a
new art, manufacture, or composition of matter. He may copyright his book,
if he pleases; but that only secures to him the exclusive right of printing and
publishing his book. So of all other inventions or discoveries.
The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings
and illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of
drawing described, though they may never have been known or used be-
fore. 134
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) ("The specification shall contain a written description ... in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the [invention]").
129 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1984). Section 102(b) provides:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work (emphasis added).
This section is the statutory articulation of the idea/expression dichotomy. 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 3, at § 2.03[D]. Simply stated the idea/expression dichotomy pro-
vides that a copyright only protects the author's expression, not the author's ideas.
This principle has long been recognized by the courts. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at
§ 13.03[A], at 13-20; see, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Rubin v. Boston
Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 1981). In this hypothetical, the idea would be
manned flight and airplane would be the novel expression.
n° See infra text accompanying notes 133-34; see also DeSilva Const. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.
Supp. 184, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1962) (even though the plans for a bridge are copyrighted, it is not an
infringement to build the bridge).
See supra note 129. Following is another often used example of the idea/expression dichot-
omy. Suppose that Shakespeare had a copyright on "Romeo and Juliet." That copyright would not
be infringed by "West Side Story." This result occurs because the only thing similar is the idea —
boy meets girl, they fall in love, their families hate each other, relationship ends in tragedy. No
expression is taken; therefore, no infringement. Accord Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
172
	 supra notes 19-20.
° 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
l" Id. at 102-03.
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The Court further stated,
But the principle is the same in all. The description of the art in a book,
though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclu-
sive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of
the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can
only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent."
In effect an author conceives an idea and then expresses it. Usually, the author's
sole concern with the form of that expression is to achieve the best means of conveying
the idea. The author does not intend to define the scope of protection the work will
receive under copyright law, that is, an author does not write a book in a certain manner
to enhance the scope of the book's copyright protection. Nevertheless, the author's
expression serves as the basis to define the scope of copyright protection.'""
In contrast, an inventor conceives an idea and then depicts the embodiment of' that
idea, the invention, in patent claims.'" The claims serve the same purpose as the author's
expression; they define the scope of protection.'" Unlike the author's expression, how-
ever, an experienced patent attorney rather than the inventor, usually drafts the claims
with the express intention of defining the scope of the inventor's protection. Moreover,
the attorney will draft the claims as broadly as possible to create the broadest right of
exclusion and thus create the greatest market power. 139
Thus, the respective rights of an author and an inventor are drastically different
even though they may have the same idea. The author has the rights to the novel, The
author cannot prevent others from writing about the idea or practicing it. On the other
hand, the inventor can acquire rights that only the prior art and the skill of the claims
drafter limit. Moreover, those rights, in effect, can prevent anyone from using or prac-
ticing the idea.
Clearly, the broad, exclusive rights that the inventor has make the invention patent
more valuable than the author's novel copyright. While both a patent and a copyright
may render a particular subject matter unique, a patent protects a much broader subject
matter than a copyright. A patent precludes anyone from entering the field while a
copyright only prevents others from copying the author's novel. Thus, the greater
breadth of uniqueness associated with a patent should give rise to far greater market
power than a copyright. Moreover, because of this discrepancy in market power, court's
extension of the presumption of market power from patents to copyrights is unwar-
ranted.
In the Wright Brothers as inventors example, the inventors practically preempted
the practice of their idea. Yet this result could never occur with a copyright. Under
copyright law, when a form of expression is the only way to express an idea, that form
will not be copyrightable.' 40 This rule is founded in the principle that a copyright does
not protect ideas.'" The Commission on New Technological Uses for Copyrighted Works
and the courts that affirmed copyright protection for computer programs thoroughly
"5 Id. at 105.
'" See supra note 122.
I" See supra note 120.
1 " Id.
"9 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
' 4" Baker, 101 U.S. 99. But see I M. DIMMER supra note 3, at § 2,18[C][1].
141 See supra notes 129-31.
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analyzed this rule in the context of computer programs.'" Basically, a copyright on a
computer program does not prevent others from making a functionally equivalent
program.'" Furthermore, if the program was the only way to express its underlying
idea, it could not be copyrighted) ." Rather, a program must have or at least be able to
have functional equivalents before it can be copyrighted. This result clearly shows the
logical inconsistency of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Data General. To get a copyright,
functional equivalents of the program must be creatable. Yet once the copyright is
obtained, the Data General court in effect presumed, for the purpose of the antitrust
laws, that no functional equivalents existed or could exist.'" Therefore, if a copyright
on a computer program is to raise any presumption about uniqueness, the presumption
should be that the program is not unique.
One additional example of the scope of rights available under patents and copyrights
will illustrate the difference between the scope of those rights and the different market
power they create. In 1981, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehrl" held that a
computer program was patentable if it did not preempt an algorithm and if the program
was used in conjunction with a physical process. The Court in Diamond was presented
only with the issue of patentability; no patent infringement claims were presented. Thus,
the patent owner in Diamond with a patent on a computer program could prevent others
from making, using, or selling a functionally equivalent program in conjuction with a
functionally equivalent process. On the other hand, if the inventor in Diamond had
obtained a copyright rather than a patent, he could not prevent others from making,
using, or selling functionally equivalent programs regardless of whether they were used
in conjunction with the process.'"
Again, this difference between the scope of patent rights and copyright rights
supports the proposition that a copyright confers uniqueness which is much narrower
in scope than that which a patent confers. Furthermore, this difference in the breadth
of uniqueness supports the theory that the extension of the presumption of market
power from patent to copyright is incorrect.
The amount of market power that a copyright confers is further limited by the
various statutory exemptions to copyright infringement, and because independent cre-
ation is not an infringement. To establish infringement, a copyright plaintiff must show
that the accused work was copied from the original.'" If the defendant in a copyright
142 CoN -ru supra note 1, at 18-20; see. e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Intl Inc., 725 F.2d
521, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1984).
145 CONTU supra note 1, at 20. A computer program when reduced to object code is nothing
more than a series of zeros and ones, i.e., 1011010110. If it took a minimum of ten statements,
each statement is either a zero or a one, to state an idea there would be 1024 (2 °) different ways
of expressing the idea. See Gemignani, supra note 70, at 289 n.113. Moreover, given the vast number
of higher level languages, each creating a potentially different form of expression for the same
object code, it is doubtful that a programmer could not produce a functionally equivalent non-
infringing program. See Davis, supra note 84. The Davis article discusses the legal and practical
aspects of making a functionally equivalent non-infringing program to IBM's BIOS operating
system. The article concludes that such a program can be made and notes that one firm, Phoenix
Inc., claims to already have such a program. Id. at 12.
'" See supra note 140; Apple Computer, 725 F.2d at 525.
' 4 ' See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
146 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981).
147 See supra notes 121, 129-31.
1" See, e.g., Kamar	 Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Intl, Inc„ 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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infringement action can show independent creation, there is no infringement." 9 This is
not the case, however, in the patent law context. In a patent infringement suit, it is
irrelevant that the defendant never saw the patent and created the infringing device
independently. 15u Patent infringement occurs whenever an unauthorized person makes,
uses, or sells the patented article, regardless of whether that article was copied.' 51
In addition to the defense of independent creation, certain statutory exceptions to
infringement limit copyright protection. The most relevant exceptions to infringement
for the purposes of copyrights on computer programs are sections 107 and 137 of the
Copyright Act. 152
 Both of these sections, however, will have a minimal effect on the
market power associated with a copyright. Section 107 is the fair use section which
exempts from infringement certain copying for the purposes of "criticism, comment,
new reporting, teaching . . . or research."'" These categories do not conclusively establish
fair use or the exclusive types of fair use. Rather, this section provides that courts apply
a four factor test to determine if a particular copy is a fair use,'" The four factors to be
considered are the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyright, the
amount of the copyrighted work that was taken, and the effect of the use on the value
of the copyright.'" The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,'"
19 See, e.g., Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1978);
Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976).
1 " E.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974); Granite Music, 532 F.2d at
720.
15 ' See supra note 121.
,52
 17 U.S.C. 3i 107 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include —
( l) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another
copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the com-
puter program should cease to be rightful.
Other limitations on the exclusive rights of a copyright owner are contained in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 108-116, 118 (1982).
I" Id. § 107.
l" Id.
1 " Id.
' 56 464 U.S. 417, 448-49, 451.
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placed particular emphasis on the first factor. The Court stated that if the use was for
profit, it would be presumptively unfair.'"
Courts have yet to develop the scope of the fair use exception in the area of computer
programs.'" In light of the Supreme Court's emphasis on profit motive defeating fair
use, however, it is doubtful that any use of a copyrighted program that would significantly
affect the market power of a copyright, would constitute a fair use. Thus, the fair use
exception would not further the argument that from a market power standpoint copy-
rights are weaker than patents.
Likewise, the exceptions in section 117 are so limited that they would have little
effect on the market power of a copyright. That section exempts from infringement any
copying or adaptation of a computer program that is an essential step in using the
program. 159 Section 117 additionally provides for the making of archival copies. 160 Both
of those situations, by their nature, would give rise to only a very small number of copies
being made. Moreover, section 117 provides that for such copies to qualify for the
exception, they cannot be independently distributed.' 6 '
Thus, neither the fair use exception nor section 117 decreases the market power
associated with a copyright. There are, however, no similar statutory exceptions in the
patent laws. 162 Although the copyright exceptions do not limit the market power of a
copyright they at least illustrate a Congressional attempt to limit the rights attainable
under copyright law that is not present with patent law.
An alternative argument could be made that a copyright creates greater market
power than a patent because the term of the copyright is substantially longer than the
patent. A copyright is effective for the life of the author plus fifty years.' 63 A patent is
only effective for seventeen years.' 64 This argument, however, is flawed in two respects.
First, it is not the duration of the rights that gives rise to uniqueness and thus market
power. Rather, it is the scope of those rights — the ability to prevent others from making
a competitive product — that is important.' 66 Thus, a limited right, although held for a
long time — a copyright — would not create the same market power as an expansive
right held for a relatively short time — a patent. This point becomes clearer upon
reexamination of the definition of market power: market power is the ability to raise
the price above what could be charged in a competitive market. 166 Because a copyright
157 Id. at 449.
156 See supra note 2.
19 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982).
' 50 /d. § 117(2).
") Id. § 117.
192 Bid cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 (1982) (reissue patents). A patent owner can apply for a reissue
patent. The reissue patent, if applied for within two years from the date the original patent issued,
can be broader than the original. Section 252 creates what are termed intervening rights. Those
rights exempt from infringement anyone whose use falls within the scope of the reissue patent, but
not within the scope of the original patent. For a recent Federal Circuit case discussing reissue
patents see Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, No. 84-1559 (Fed. Cir. March 30, 1985).
' 65 17 U.S.C. 302(a) (1982). This section only applies to works created after January 1, 1978,
and by one author. The duration of copyright protection can vary depending on different circum-
stances. See id. §§ 302-304. Nevertheless, all of those statutory periods for copyright protection are
longer than a patent's term.
164 35 U.S.C. § 154,
' 6 ' See supra notes 19-20.
Jo" Id.
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on a program does not prevent competitors from developing functionally equivalent
programs, the copyright does not reduce competition.' 67 Moreover, as long as competi-
tion remains vigorous, the copyright owner will be unable, or at least foolish, to charge
prices above competitive levels. Therefore, because a copyright on a program never
enables its owner to restrict competitive programs, the length of time that the copyright
exists would have no effect on the market power of the copyright. 169
Second, the argument that the duration of a copyright creates greater market power
than a patent is further flawed when applied to copyrighted computer programs because
programs are valuable for a very limited time. At the very best a computer program will
retain its value for approximately five years.'69
 Thus, the program itself will be valueless
long before the copyright expires.
In summary, courts' extension of the presumption of market power from patents
to copyrights is unwarranted. A patent creates substantially greater rights than a copy-
right. A copyright, unlike a patent, does not preclude the manufacture of functional
equivalents. Moreover, a copyright owner's exclusive rights do not prevent independent
creation and are subject to statutory exceptions. In contrast, a patent owner's exclusive
rights are not so limited. Finally, that a copyright lasts longer than a patent does not
support an argument that copyrights have equal or greater market power than patents.
Therefore, courts should abandon the presumption that a copyright on the tying product
establishes market power.
B. Loew's and Paramount Do Not Apply to Copy
-righted Computer Programs
Even if courts do not totally reject the presumption that a copyright confers market
power, courts should not extend it from the facts involved in Loew's and Paramount to
computer programs. In both Loew's and Paramount, the Supreme Court held that copy-
rights on movies created a presumption of market power.'" Courts should not extend
that holding to computer programs because the underlying facts regarding computer
programs and movies are totally different.
All works of authorship divide into two theoretical parts: the idea and the expression.
Copyright only protects the expression."' Looking at the two theoretical parts of a
movie, the expression is the part in which all the value lies. For example, in "Gone with
the Wind," the value in the movie is the expression — Clark Gable and Vivian Leigh
acting on screen. People will pay to see those actors in that movie. There is, however,
little value in the idea of setting a love story amidst the turmoils of the Civil War.
The Loew's Court implicitly recognized this proposition when it stated, "forcing a
television station which wants 'Gone With The Wind' to take 'Getting Gertie's Garter' as
well is taking undue advantage of the fad that to television as well as motion picture
viewers there is but one 'Gone With The Wind. -172
 Both films were copyrighted.' 73
167 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
" To use a rather extreme example, if one had the exclusive right to jump off the Empire
State Building, that exclusive right would have little or no market power whether it lasted for one
day or 100 years.
169
 The program will become obsolete and thus unable to compete for sales against newer
programs. See I D. BENDER, supra note 3, at § 3A.07[2j, at 3A-71.
172
 See supra notes 36-47,55-66 and accompanying text.
01 See supra notes 129-31 1 .
12 371 U.S. at 48 n.6.
' 73 Id. at 50.
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Moreover, if market power arose solely from the copyright, rather than from the value
of what the copyright protected, "Getting Gertie's Garter" would have had the same
market power as "Gone With The Wind." This result is contrary to common sense and
clearly not what the Loew's Court intended.' 74
Thus, in the context of movies, the copyright protects the theoretical part of the
work that has value. Therefore, a movie copyright would increase the value already
present in the work by preventing others from copying the valuable portion of the work
— the expression. This is not the situation, however, with a computer program. In a
computer program, the greatest value resides in the idea portion of the work, not in the
expression.'" It is the idea portion of a program that has true value, and competitors
are able to use the idea to create functionally equivalent programs.'" Thus, in a computer
program, the copyright does not protect the part with the greatest value — the idea —
but rather protects the part of lesser value — the expression.
The recent development of a functionally equivalent program to IBM's BIOS illus-
trates this point. BIOS is the operating system program used in IBM personal comput-
ers.'" If a competitive personal computer manufacturer wants its personal computers
to run IBM applications programs it will have to use BIOS or another operating systems
program that has the same functions as BIOS.'" Although BIOS is copyrighted, the
copyright does not protect BIOS's functions. Yet it is the functions that IBM's competitors
are interested in. Moreover, the value of those functions is substantial; a BIOS equivalent
can cost $290,000. 1 "
Although the idea portion of a computer program is considerably more valuable
than the expression, the expression in a computer program is not altogether valueless.
Copyright protection of expression does prevent direct pirating of a program, which
would offer the copyright holder some economic power.'" Nevertheless, the presump-
tion of market power applied to copyrighted movies in Loew's and Paramount should not
apply to copyrighted computer programs because the main value of a program lies in
the idea, which copyright does not protect."' Therefore, the presumption of market
power should not be extended from copyrighted movies to copyrighted programs.
"'The Paramount Court's opinion also has strong language that evidences the Court's position
that it was the value of the films in conjunction with the copyright and not the copyright alone that
gave rise to the presumption of market power. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
173 A purchaser of computer software is not concerned with the expression of the program;
rather a purchaser is concerned with the function of the program — people buy programs to solve
problems. Ste Gilburne, supra note 84, at 1.
3 " See Davis, supra note 84, at 11.
'77 Id.
' 7 " Id. at 11-12.
"5 Id. at 12.
180 See Greguras, Technical and Other Practical Software Protection Measures, THE COMPUTER LAW.,
April 1984, at 22,23.
1 " The court in Capital Temporaries, Inc. of Hartford v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.
1974), distinguished Loew's using a similar rationale. The Capital court stated:
The appellant misreads Loew's if he concludes that the mere existence of the copy-
righted tying motion pictures was enough to create the tying. The tied films were also
copyrighted, so that if copyright were the sole factor there would have been a coun-
tervailing power. The tying was created by the attractiveness of some of the films, as
contrasted to the inferior quality of the others also required to be purchased in the
package. Thus the Court in its opinion cited the trial court's "apt example" of forcing
a television station which wants "Gone With the Wind" to take with it "Getting Gertie's
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C. The Presumption of Market Power Will Force Companies to Forego Copyright Protection
Extending the presumption of market power to copyrighted computer programs
contravenes the copyright laws' objective of increasing public disclosure. The exclusive
rights granted under copyright law are intended to encourage the production of works.' 82
Moreover, the primary objective of copyright law is to increase the amount of material
that is available to the public."" This objective is accomplished through two means. First,
once an author knows that a work is protected, the author will sell or license the work
to the public in order to reap a reward. Moreover, the more people that have the work,
the greater will be the reward. Second, after the copyright expires, the work is dedicated
to the public. Thus, anyone can have access to it without charge. 164
Extending the presumption of market power to copyrighted computer programs
would discourage the copyrighting of programs. If a company decided that it was
necessary to market its hardware and software in a package, it would most likely forego
copyright protection on the software. The company would forego copyright protection
to avoid the presumption of market power and the resulting likelihood of a finding of
per se illegatity. 183 The risk of a treble damage award under the antitrust lawslo would
far outweigh the risk of losing the program to pirates. Moreover, the risk that the
program would be stolen can be minimized through trade secret protectionm and
physical means of designing the program.'" Even if trade secret protection was even-
tually held to be preempted by copyright law, a result that is both unlikely and improper,'"
Garter." United States v. Loew's Inc., supra, 371 U.S. at 48 n.6, 83 S. Ct. 97 n.6. Once
the attractiveness of the tying product is established, the economic power test is then
met by the patent or the copyright, since competitors cannot offer the distinctive
product (e.g., "Gone With the Wind") without violating the patent of the copyright of
the tier.
Id. at 663-64. The issue before the Capital court, however, was the tying of trademarks not
copyrights. Id. at 661.
182 U.S. CONST. art. 1, 8, cl. 8, provides: "To promote the progress of science and the useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to these respective
writings and discoveries."
183 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (citing Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931)).
L" See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
t85 See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
188 See supra note 13.
187 See supra note 4.
188 See generally Greguras, supra note 180 (discussing types of physical protection).
' 8° 17 U.S.C. f 301(a) (1982) provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
There are two components to a preemption analysis. First, it must be determined if there are
equivalent rights involved. Second, it must be determined if the work at issue is protectable under
copyright law. Trade secret law is designed to prevent wrongful appropriation of valuable infor-
mation. See UNIF. TRADE SECTS. Ac'r § 1 comment (1979); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939)
(liability for disclosure or use of another's trade secret). Therefore to state a cause of action under
trade secret law, a plaintiff must show either wrongful appropriation or breach of a confidential
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the program owner could still find protection under contract law. 19"
A trade secret, as the name implies., must be kept secret in order to receive protec-
tion.' 9 ' Thus programs protected by trade secrets would not be open to the public. This
secrecy requirement would nevertheless not stop the large scale distribution of programs.
Either sellers could enter into confidential relationships with the program's purchasers' 92
or they could package the program so that any attempt to discover the program's secrets
would destroy the program. 19'
The market power presumption therefore decreases the number of copyrighted
programs. This in turn decreases the amount of information open to the public. In
summary, anyone can read and learn from a copyrighted work. The same is not true of
a trade secret. Thus, forcing programmers to seek protection via trade secrets rather
than copyrighted computer programs contravenes the copyright law's objective of in-
creasing available knowledge.
In addition to decreasing the amount of available knowledge, forcing companies to
rely on trade secrets and contracts will have a disproportionate detrimental effect on
smaller companies. First, the smaller company is more likely to need to market its
hardware and software in a package to enable it to compete with larger companies like
IBM. Second, only a large company would be able to exact the necessary contract terms
to assure trade secret protection. IBM can rely on its reputation for quality and as an
industry leader to force a purchaser into the necessary contractual provisions to protect
a program. It is doubtful that a small company would have enough clout to exact the
necessary contractual provisions to protect a program. Thus, extending the presumption
of market power to copyrighted computer programs ultimately will reduce rather than
foster competition.
This argument does not propose that it is permissible to violate the antitrust laws in
order to compete more effectively. Instead, this argument merely states that placing the
relationship. UNIF. TRADE SEcrs. Acr § 1 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). This is not
the case for copyright infringement. See supra note 122. Moreover, copyright does not protect the
physical object upon which the work is fixed, 17 U.S.C. 202 (1982), while trade secret would.
Thus, it is at least arguable that trade secret rights are not equivalent to copyright's exclusive rights.
Secondly, although a computer program is copyrightable subject matter, see supra note 3, only
the program's expression is protected by copyright law, see supra notes 129-31 and accompanying
text. On the other hand, trade secret law protects the entire program, both ideas and expression.
UNIF. TRADE SECTS. ACT § 1(4) (1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Thus, at least with
respect to the ideas involved, trade secret extends protection to non-copyrightable subject matter.
Nevertheless, there are still those who argue for partial or total preemption of trade secret law.
See, e.g., Sadler, Federal Copyright Protection and State Trade Secret Protection: The Case for Partial
Preemption, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 667 (1984); Laurie & Everett, supra note 4, at 4. Moreover, the courts
have not conclusively resolved this issue. Compare Freedman v. Select Information Sys., 221 U.S.P.Q.
848, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (no preemption); Warrington Assocs. Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys. Inc.,
522 F. Supp. 367, 368-69 (N.D. III. 1981) (no preemption); BPI Sys. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208,
211 (W,D, Tex. 1981) (no preemption) with Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471,
1477 (D. Nev. 1983) (preemption); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474
F. Supp. 37, 42 (N.D. 'rex. 1979) (preemption).
19° See test articulated supra note 168.
191 See UNIF. TRADE SECTS. ACT § 1 comment (1979); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1, at 757
comment b (1939); E.1. du Pont DeNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
142 See 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 1, at § 3.01.
195 See supra note 191.
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presumption of market power on computer programs deprives smaller competitors of
an otherwise legal means of competition. A brief' example will suffice. Suppose that a
small saw mill owner invents a device that will automatically cut up a log in the most
efficient manner. This device uses conventional saw mill equipment, with one exception.
A cam controls the entire device and is the key to the device's proper functioning.
Moreover, the owner keeps the shape of the cam secret. When the device is sold, the
cam is encased in a box in such a manner that any attempt to discover the cam's secret
shape would destroy
The saw mill owner then markets the cam and the other conventional equipment
only as a package. Eventually the owner comes under the scrutiny of the antitrust laws
for an alleged tying violation. For the purposes of this argument, assume that the cam
and the conventional equipment are separate items and the seller conditions purchase
of the cam on the purchase of the conventional saw mill equipment. Furthermore, assume
that there is a substantial effect on commerce in the tied market of conventional saw
mill equipment. Thus, two of the three requirements of per se illegality are met.'"
. The final requirement, market power in the tying product, will depend on the facts
surrounding the cam, that is how desirable it is, how easily a similar cam can be inde-
pendently created, and how much time and money using the cam saves a saw mill.
Importantly, a court will not presume that the cam has market power." Therefore, if
the cam in fact has sufficient market power, a court would impose antitrust liability. On
the other hand, if the cam, for whatever reason, did not have sufficient market power,
there would be no per se antitrust violation. 07
Now assume that the latter situation is the case, ,
 that the cam does not have market
power. The owner then replaces the cam with a mini computer containing a special
program. That program performs exactly the same function as the cam — they are
functional equivalents. Additionally, the program is copyrighted. Once the operator
replaces the cam with the copyrighted program, the presumption of market power comes
into play, resulting in the imposition of liability)"
The copyrighted program would be no more or less desirable than the cam. The
copyright would not prevent the creation of functional equivalents, of either other cams
or other programs.' 99
 The anti-competitive effects would remain the same. Nevertheless,
the replacement of the cam with a copyrighted program would give rise to antitrust
liability. This example clearly illustrates the potential injustice that could arise if the
courts extend the presumption of market power to copyrighted computer programs.
Moreover, abandoning the presumption would not'contravene the policies against
tying agreements. 2u° Plaintiffs could still prove that the tying product had the requisite
market power, although now the copyright would only be a factor in determining
uniqueness of the tying product and not dispositive of it. The result in both Paramount
and Lotw's would not change. In those cases the copyrighted articles were unique in and
of themselves and the copyright only added to their uniqueness.20 ' In the computer
194 Id,
1 " See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
196 See supra note 33.
197 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
' 9" See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
19% See supra notes 129-31 and notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
I'm See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
401
 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
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context, a plaintiff could establish market power by showing that the copyright prohibited
direct copying and that creating a functional equivalent program would be impossible
because of the cost involved. Thus, abandoning the presumption of market power for
copyrights would not give rise to anti-competitive practices. Rather, such abandonment
would create an environment in which courts could restrict truly anti-competitive prac-
tices without placing an arbitrary and undue burden on legitimate practices.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts should abandon the presumption that a copyright on a computer program
creates the requisite market power to establish per se illegality. Courts erroneously
extended the presumption from patents to copyrights. Even if courts do not abandon
the general presumption that a copyright creates market power, they should not apply
the presumption to copyrighted computer programs. The difference in protection a
copyright affords computer programs, in comparison with other literary works, such as
movies, supports this conclusion. Finally, extending the presumption to computer pro-
grams will result in fewer copyrights. This result will defeat the copyright law's objective
of increasing public knowledge. In addition, small companies will be disproportionately
hurt.
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